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Weathers: Weathers: Taxation in Missouri-1957

TAXATION IN MISSOURI-1957*
BuELL F. WEAThERS**

The decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri during 1957 in the
field of taxation and related subjects, while not numerous, included one of
first impression and others of general interest.

1.

SUBJECT AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION

A. Real Estate Taxes
In State ex rel. Benson v. Personnel Housing, Inc.,' the defendant
corporation had leased certain land owned by the United States and had
constructed housing units on the leased premises for rental to military
and civilian personnel of the army. The lease originally provided that
title to all improvements should remain in the lessee during the term of
the lease, but defendant entered into a modification of the lease so as
to provide that the improvements were real estate and property of the
United States, apparently having sought thereby to insure its contentions
that its interest in the property was immune from taxation by reason of
title being vested in the United States Government and also that there
was no statutory authority to assess its leasehold interest in the property.
Pointing out that the enjoyment of the entire worth of the buildings and
improvements would be had by defendant as the lease was for seventyfive years while the buildings and improvements only had an estimated
useful life of thirty-five years, the court held that defendant's interest
in the property was not innune from but subject to taxation both before
and after the lease was changed. Defendant's interest in the property was
held to be classified as real estate for the purposes of taxation by section
137.010 (2), Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), and the assessment of such
interest as real estate was a legal assessment and not void as contended
by defendant.

*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1957 Missouri court decisions.
**Attorney, Springfield, Missouri; A.B., University of Missouri, 1948, LL.B., 1950.
1. 300 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. 1957).
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B. Inheritance Taxes
A case of first impression was that of In Re Gerling's Estate, 2 in
which the supreme court noted that the present inheritance tax act 3 as
amended, although in effect for forty years, had never been construed
by it with reference to joint tenancies. Exceptions had been taken to an
inheritance tax appraiser's report which included certain real and personal property held at the time of decedent's death by said decendent and
her brother as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Noting the
familiar doctrine that tax laws are to be strictly construed and stressing
the well-established doctrine that the right of survivorship does not
pass anything from a deceased joint tenant to a surviving joint tenant
who takes rather by virtue of the conveyance by which the joint tenancy
was created, the court held that property held in joint tenancy is not
subject to state inheritance tax upon the death of one of the joint tenants.
In re Atkins' Estate4 held that the rights given by the new probate
code 5 to a surviving spouse, upon election to take against the will, to
receive by descent one-half of the estate if the testator leaves no lineal
descendants or one-third of the estate if the testator leaves lineal
descendants," were marital rights and that one-third of the net estate of
a testator survived by a widow and three children was properly deducted
as a marital right in determining the clear market value of the property
transferred by will to the widow and subject to state inheritance tax.
However, it is no longer necessary to rely upon the case to reach such a
result because, as noted in the opinion, the sixty-ninth general assembly,
even before the opinion was handed down, clarified the situation by
amending the inheritance tax exemption statute7 so as to permit expressly
such deducation without reference to whether or not it was a marital
right.
C. Excise Taxes
Applying a well settled rule that one voluntarily proceeding under
a statute or ordinance and accepting its benefits cannot later question its
validity in order to avoid its burdens, the court held in St. Louis Public

2.

303 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1957), 23 Mo. L. R!v. 240 (1958).

3. §§ 145.010-.350, RSMo 1949, as amended.
4.

307 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. 1957).

5. Mo. Laws 1955, at 385-496, §§ 1-355, codified as cc. 472-75 and §§ 481.070,
.130, 483A80, .582, RSMo 1957 Supp.
6. Mo. Laws 1955, at 465, § 252, codified as § 474.160, RSMo 1957'Supp.
7. § 145.090(3), RSMo 1957 Supp.
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Serv. Co. v. City of St. Louis" that a bus company was estopped from
attacking the validity of an ordinance in an effort to avoid an occupation
tax of five per cent of gross receipts imposed by that ordinance where, for
many years, the bus company had periodically applied for and received
valuable permits under the ordinance for operation of its buses. Going
beyond the scope of the majority opinion, Judge Hyde, dissenting, concluded that section 301.340, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), is not
mandatory and does not require that any occupation tax imposed on the
business of transporting passengers be measured only by the number of
vehicles engaged in such transportation.

11.

ASSESSMENT

or

GENERAL PRoPERTY TAxEs

In Hellman v. St. Louis County,9 contracts were entered into between
St. Louis County, a county of the first class operating under a home
rule charter and two appraisal companies for the appraisal of certain
realty in the county in connection with the ultimate assessment of such
realty for taxation purposes. The contracts provided for the appraisal in
1956 of property in only one-third of the county and granted the county
options in 1957 and 1958 for similar services as to the remainder of the
property in the county. The contracts were not invalid as an improper
delegation of powers enjoined by law solely upon the assessor nor were
they invalid on the ground that they constituted an unlawful appraisal
adki assessment of real property pursuant to a three year plan in violation
of statutes requiring all real property in St. Louis County to be assessed
at its true value each year. The contracts did not contemplate the
relinquishment by the assessor of his duties to the appraisal companies
and did not contemplate or direct that the assessor should not assess all
of the taxable property of the county at its true value each year to the
best of his ability but, on the contrary, merely contemplated that he
should have the benefit of an expertly appraised valuation of certain land
within the county in making the assessment of 1957 and that the county
might furnish him with such assistance as to other real property in the
county in either or both of the ensuing years.
III. TAx SAixs AN TiTLs
Section 140.590, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), the three-year
8. 302 S.W.2d 875 (Mo. 1957)
9. 302 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. 1957).

(en banc).
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limitation statute against attack on a collector's tax deed, continued to
receive attention 0 in Giliam v. Gohn.1" In an effort to escape the
application of the statute, plaintiffs contended that defendant, being in
possession of the property as a cotenant, was under a duty to pay taxes
thereon but fraudulently procured her father-in-law to purchase the
property at a tax sale, that such purchase was in fact a purchase by
defendant for herself and amounted to a *payment of the taxes by
defendant for the benefit of all the cotenants, and that such payment
fell within the exception "where the taxes have been paid"' 2 as contained
in the statute. After gravely questioning whether a cotenant in possession
of property is under a duty to pay the taxes thereon, the court held that
the payment referred to in the statute as an exception thereto was a
payment of the taxes to the governmental body involved prior to the
sale and was not meant to include a "payment" such as the one claimed
by plaintiffs to have occurred as a result of the tax sale. After noting that
the statute is a special statute of limitations not containing any exception
for fraud, the court, by way of dictum, stated that the running of a special
statute of limitations cannot be tolled for any reason not provided in the
statute itself, thereby implying that the suit would have been barred even
if the petition had stated a valid cause of action based on fraud. As for
plaintiffs' contention that the statute was inapplicable because the tax
deed was void on its face for inadequate consideration, the court held that
the tax deed, which recited a consideration of $109.96 but said nothing
concerning improvements or the value of the lot, was not void on its face
for inadequate consideration so as to prevent the operation of the
limitation provided in the statute and, again by way of dictum, suggested
the general applicability of the statute in cases of supposed or constructive
fraud for inadequacy of consideration.
In Johnson v. StulU,' 3 a collector's deed conveying a lot worth at
least $1200.00 as indicated by the evidence and sold for $81.64 was
canceled on the ground of fraud because the consideration was so grossly

10. See Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1951-Property,17 Mo. L.
REV. 398, 401-02 (1952); Eastin, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1951-Taxation,
17 Mo. L. REv. 409, 410-11 (1952); Eastin, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1952Taxation, 18 Mo. L. REV. 382, 385 (1953); Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court
for 1953-Property,19 Mo. L. REv. 335, 339-41 (1954); Comment, 20 Mo. L. REv. 87-98
(1955), and cases discussed therein.
11. 303 S.W.2d 101 (Mo. 1957).
12. Id. at 107.
13. 303 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. 1957).
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inadequate as to shock the conscience, and purchasers from the tax sale
purchaser were held not to be bona fide purchasers inasmuch as they had
constructive notice of everything the instruments on file, including the
collector's deed, showed with respect to the tax sale purchaser's chain of
title and, therefore, were held to know that the lot "had been sold for a
consideration so grossly inadequate as to, in law, amount to fraud and to
call for the cancellation of"' 4 the collector's deed.
IV. MzscELLAMOus

Where the evidence failed to show that any money received by a
county by reason of the collection of taxes levied for road and bridge
purposes by the county court against property located in a previously
disorganized special road district was not expended by the county for
the use and benefit of roads and bridges located in the former special
road district, a corporation which had supplied labor and materials to
such former road district for the maintenance and repair of its roads
could not recover from the county for such labor and materials on the
theory that the county was unjustly enriched by the receipt of money
which in equity and in good conscience belonged to the corporation. 16
State ex rel. Missouri Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n'G is not a
tax case but involves the closely related question of the rate of return to
which a public utility company is entitled, Determination of such rate of
return on the basis of the formula of original cost less depreciation and
without giving any consideration whatever to evidence relating to the
present "fair value" of the company's property was declared improper.
The opinion is lengthy but worthy of note inasmuch as it is the first such
opinion on the subject by the supreme court in several years.

14. Id. at 119.
15. Midwest Precote Co. v. Clay County, 303 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1957).
16. 308 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1957).
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